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Beyond Bali

Subaltern Citizens
and Post-Colonial Intimacy

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Introduction

This book is an ethnography that charts reconfigurations of *kebalian* (Balineseness) – a notion that encompasses the personal, social, and cultural complexities involved in being persons and collectives of Balinese ethnicity in post-colonial Dutch society. I explore how Balinese subaltern citizens engage in discourses and materialities of the colonial in the present by asserting claims of proximity between themselves and the Dutch on the basis of colonial history through an active production of what I call post-colonial intimacy. My understanding of Balinese subaltern citizens' claims of proximity that emerged so prominently in my ethnographic material urges me not to see them through the binary oppositions of remoteness and proximity, of harmony and disorder. Rather, I argue that post-colonial intimacy generated by Balinese subaltern citizens is produced relationally and needs to be situated within the following contexts: the specificities of Dutch colonialism in Bali and Balinese understandings of historical agency; wider understandings of Balinese culture as paradisiacal and Balinese people as peace-loving; the Balinese and Dutch common sense of threat from and vulnerability to radical Islam; and the existence of the Indies cultural landscape in the Netherlands, which is characterized by its rich and complex colonial inheritance that has been developing since the 1950s. Thus, post-colonial intimacy here should be seen as a wide spectrum of dynamic relationships that are experienced as familiarity, proximity, and closeness and are generated through a continuum of dis-harmony and tensions.

In analyzing the production of *kebalian,* I draw on a large body of scholarship that discusses Balinese identity politics in Bali. Michael Picard (1996a, 1999, 2000) conceptualizes *kebalian* as a 'transcultural discourse' by stressing its historically constructed, interactive character. His discussion focuses on the Balinese intelligentsia's investment in the production of discourses which take religion (*agama*), custom (*adat*), and culture (*budaya*) to be the central features of Balinese identity politics. Drawing on the work of Picard (1996, 1996a) and other scholars who approach Balinese culture and identity politics as an ongoing process of becoming (e.g. Vickers 1989; Howe 1999, 2004; Connor and Vickers 2003; Jennaway 2002; Ramstedt 2004; Schulte Nordholt 2007; Fox 2011), I study the production of *kebalian* in the context of Balinese diasporic formations.

Method of Inquiry

This book is based on data collected and developed over a ten-year, three-phase period (2003-2004, 2006, 2009) of participant observation in the Netherlands and Bali, and shorter visits to each place in 2011, 2012, and 2014. Supplemented by textual analysis of travel writings, film, fiction, and magazines concerned with Balinese interactions with Euro-American foreigners, my methods were principally centred on participant observations and the collection of life narratives in multi-sited settings (Marcus 1995). My focus on Balinese subaltern citizens and their Balinese-Dutch families meant that I participated in their everyday lives, observing and talking to Balinese men and women and their children. As an ethnographer living with and amongst my interlocutors, I travelled with them as they moved within their national and transnational networks and stayed in contact with key interlocutors through email and phone conversations. Over the course of the last ten years, some of my interlocutors have changed their place of residence either within the Netherlands and/or in Bali or between the two countries. These local and transnational movements were largely determined by socio-economic and political conditions, as for example in the period following the economic crisis of 1997 and around the Bali bombings in 2002 and 2005, when several families that had lived in Bali decided to move permanently to the Netherlands.

For centuries, people, objects, and ideas have continuously moved between the Netherlands and the Indonesian archipelago, influencing the private, political, and religious spheres. In his seminal work on Balinese colonial society, Henk Schulte Nordholt (1986: 1-13) outlines Dutch attempts to transform the Balinese political system from what he referred to as being in 'a state of flux' into a 'fixed order', emphasizing the important political and societal changes that took place during the less than forty years of Dutch colonialism.[1] The colonial government's project of 'traditionalizing' Balinese society through the 'cultural-cum-educational' policy named 'Balinization' (*Baliseering*) was launched in the 1920s and was expected to bring about a 'renaissance' of Balinese culture (Picard 2000: 89). This policy aimed to find the singularity of Balinese-Hindu heritage, perceiving it to be made in opposition to Islam and Christianity. While the policy had long-lasting consequences for Balinese identity discourses, I think

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1   Dutch intervention in Northern Bali commenced in 1846, but it was only in 1908 that the entire island was subjugated. The Imperial Japanese Army occupied Bali in 1942, along with the rest of the colonial Dutch East Indies.

it is important to consider the encounters through which interactions between the colonized people and the colonizers occurred as 'an active process of appropriation' (Jolly 2005: 138); a 'colonial dialogue' (Kelly 1991) in which the boundaries between the two were contested rather than determined. Cautioning against crediting the 'colonial gaze' (Kelly 1997) with too much power in the Balinese context, Picard (1999: 23) has stressed the importance of considering the active agency of colonized people. It is similarly important, as Vickers (1996) has persuasively argued, to take into account the mutual connections between the Dutch (and other Westerners[2]) and Balinese people rather than solely focus on intentions made by Dutch colonial officials and the Balinese political elite. This approach allows us to acknowledge the role of Euro-American artists and anthropologists in the colony and their mutual interaction with Balinese intellectuals, artists, leaders, and peasants. These interactions gave rise to novel forms of interaction and creative production within Balinese visual and performing arts circles at the beginning of the twentieth century (Geertz 1994; Vickers 2002). Approaching these and other encounters between colonized and colonizer through the lens of an active appropriation is important not only for understanding colonial interactions in Bali or elsewhere but also to foreground Balinese subaltern citizens' claims and engagements, through which post-colonial intimacy is generated.

Drawing on Gyanendra Pandey's work (2008: 276-277), I utilize the notion of the subaltern citizen, acknowledging its political potential of subalternity. The term subaltern is derived from Italian political theorist Antonio Gramsci's work on cultural hegemony. He uses the term subaltern to describe 'history told from below' by social groups that have been excluded from society's political representations. The term subaltern was brought to postcolonial studies by a group of South Asian historians who called themselves the Subaltern Studies Group and who were interested in the political role of mass populations in South Asian history. Since the 1970s, the term has gradually begun to denote colonized people in South Asia but is also used as a term of reference for colonized peoples more generally.

The subaltern conceptualization allows us to take into account the historical agency of individuals and collectives and the echoing effect of this agency in the present by taking into consideration all their potentialities and limitations. Furthermore, the term prevents the simplistic

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2   I use the term 'the West' and Westerners ironically, with the understanding that it 'refers to the effects of hegemonic representations of the Western self rather than its subjugated traditions' (Gupta 1998: 36).

compartmentalization of 'us' (citizens and people with history) versus 'them' (the subalterns, without history) and of 'our' time/place (of equality and democracy) versus earlier times/places (lacking democracy and equality). In a broad sense, this book explores citizenship-making and home-making processes by focusing on the Balinese perspective rather than discussing the technologies of government, which, according to Michel Foucault (2000), are a set of organized practices (techniques and rationalities) through which all subjects are governed. Drawing on Foucault's work, Aiwa Ong (1999, 1999a, 2003) has argued that all migrants are subjected to specific processes of governmental subject-making designed to turn them into 'good enough' citizens.

Remaining mindful of Foucault's notion of biopolitics, which he derived from his conception of biopower to discuss how state power operates over both the physical and political bodies of a population, my analysis is predominantly focused on the Balinese people and their projects of personal and collective self-making. It is important to reiterate here that I take the power of biopolitics seriously but believe that focusing the analytical lens on citizens' processes of self-making allows us both to engage with individual responses to states' regulatory norms and to consider a wider spectrum of engagements, perspectives, and interpretations. This spectrum would remain largely marginalized if we were to focus only on governmental institutions and their effect on migrant populations, or indeed if we focused solely on how migrants respond to institutional regulatory norms (Ong 2003). The latter phenomenon is particularly significant in the case of refugees, who are often exposed to extreme classificatory measurements through the biopolitics of otherness (Fassin 2001). While I agree that otherness remains an important conceptualization in the regulation of migrant populations in general, I want to stress that we need to pay closer attention to dynamic aspects of othering and the production of otherness that occur among citizens in everyday interactions. In particular, I am interested in how certain foreigners might be perceived as more threatening than others by state bureaucrats and autochthonous citizens but also how subaltern citizens engage in othering processes to generate their own ethnicized and racialized hierarchies of value (Herzfeld 2007). In the case of Balinese subaltern citizens, othering is situated within historical contingencies but always in dialogue with state discourses and contemporary geopolitics. In other words, historical memory and an understanding of colonial relations are as crucial as colonial classifications of people and cultures in current dynamics of otherness, both in everyday interactions and within governmental regulation.

Through comparative analyses of European bureaucratic structures, a number of scholars (Jordan et al. 2003; Olwig 2011) have shown that bureaucrats have a significant amount of discretionary power when applying immigration policies to individuals or families because the specific circumstances of particular immigration cases are frequently 'too complicated to fit into the standard formats of policy provisions' (Jordan et al. 2003: 213). Because of this, the treatment of individual cases may be influenced by the individual administrative officer's attitudes towards various cultures. It is in the interaction between Balinese people and different state administrators – including immigration officers, those in charge of integration procedures, marriage celebrants, and social workers – that Balinese culture and ethnicity are (re)produced not only as non-threatening but also as possessing desirable social and cultural capital. As my ethnography demonstrates, the presence of Balinese migrants in the Netherlands serves as confirmation that the autochthonous Dutch self is willing to accept difference as long as it is perceived as non-threatening. In this way, Balinese migration offers an exotic allure that helps to alleviate the Dutch nation's fast-fading self-image of tolerance. Before I proceed further, it is necessary to briefly reflect on the development of prevailing paradisiacal images of Bali and Balinese-Dutch historical encounters.

A Glimpse at History

Balinese people and culture have often been imagined as authentic, pure, and geographically undifferentiated (Vickers 1989). However, Balinese identity formation is, in fact, highly varied and has historically been deeply affected by transnational trajectories. Interactions between the Balinese and the Dutch go back to the the first Dutch voyages to the Indonesian archipelago in 1597, when the Dutch fleet first stopped at Bali in search of food and water. During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, Dutch references to Bali appeared only occasionally in the registers of the Dutch East Indies Company (*Vereenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie,* or VOC), mainly in relation to the slave trade which was at the time the VOC's main commercial activity in Bali (Wiener 1995: 25).

The Dutch made their first efforts to colonize Bali in the early nineteenth century, when Bali was composed of nine kingdoms – Klungkung, Karangasem, Buleleng, Jembrana, Tabanan, Mengwi, Badung, Gianyar, and Bangli. These kingdoms had, from time to time, been caught up in battles amongst themselves for regional power and domination (Bakker 1993; Schulte Northolt 1996). The first kingdom conquered by the Dutch was Buleleng, in 1849,

followed by Jembrana in 1853. The kings of Karangasem and Gianyar made timely peaceful agreements with the Dutch in 1895 and 1900 respectively, while the kingdoms of Bandung and Klungkung, which refused to recognize Dutch colonial rule, were subjugated by military force in events known as *puputan* (finishing, ending). The first *puputan* occurred in 1904, when the entire royal family of Bandung and their retainers – unarmed and dressed in white – walked up to the colonial army to meet their death. The Dutch took Klungkung in 1908, when the Dewa Agung chose the same death for himself, his family, and his retainers in another *puputan* (Wiener 1995). These events 'sent shock waves through some of the capitals of Europe and led to vigorous protests' (Vickers 1989: 92).

The *puputan* had a profound influence on Dutch-Balinese relations (Picard 1996a: 19-20; Vickers 1989: 92). The overwhelmingly negative response of foreign diplomats to the mass deaths of unarmed royal courts posed a potential threat to Dutch colonial control in the East Indies. To mitigate the negative effect of their actions, the Dutch government attempted to cultivate a better image of their colonial policies within the international community by promoting the preservation of Balinese culture. In 1908, the colonial government opened tourist offices in Batavia and Bali. The latter was at the time described as 'the Gem of the Lesser Sunda Isles' (Picard 1990: 4). Dutch colonial policy was strongly influenced by a specific image of Bali according to which Java had 'degenerated' under the impact of Islam while Bali had flourished because it had remained Hindu. Thus, Bali was incorporated into the Dutch colonial state as a 'living museum' of Hindu-Javanese civilization – the one and only surviving heir to the Hindu heritage displaced from Java by the invasion of Islam (Vickers 1989). Bali was also seen as 'little India' because it possessed a caste system with 'despotic' rulers, and Balinese aristocrats were perceived as oppressors who imposed themselves on an essentially democratic indigenous people who lived in 'independent village republics' (Covarrubias 1937; Howe 2001: 21). These views were significantly influenced by Sir Thomas Stamford Raffles, who served as the British Lieutenant-Governor in Java for five years.

Raffles' five years in Java had profound consequences for colonial policies as well as for European representations of Balinese culture and society. A passionate Orientalist, Raffles brought with him from India a keen interest in the ancient Hindu-Buddhist culture. In his understanding, the Balinese were preserving elements of the glorious Javanese past (Wiener 1995: 26), and Dutch colonial officials were accordingly setting out to 'simplify the village administration and return it to its original state' (Assistant Resident H.J.E.F. Schwartz, quoted in Schulte Nordholt 1986: 32; and Picard 1999:

20). This view is best illustrated in a statement written by G.P. Rouffaer, former officer at the Bali Instituut, founded in 1915 as part of the Koloniaal Instituut:

> Let the Balinese live their own beautiful native life as undisturbed as possible! Their agriculture, their village life, their own forms of worship, their religious art, their own literature – all bear witness to an autonomous native civilization of rare versatility and richness. No railroads on Bali; no Western coffee plantations; and especially no sugar factories! But also no proselytising, neither Mohammedan (by zealous natives from other parts of the Indies) nor Protestant nor Roman Catholic. Let the colonial administration, with the strong backing of the Netherlands government, treat the island of Bali as a rare jewel that we must protect and whose virginity must remain intact. (cited in Robinson 1995: 41)

What Dutch colonial officials however wanted to present as a policy preserving the indigenous culture from foreign influences was in fact a new policy introduced by the colonial power in the 1910s and 1920s, known as the 'Balinization of Bali' (*Baliseering*). Dutch scholars and colonial officers – particularly F.A. Lietrinck (whose research was based in North Bali and represented a regional variation) and Rudolf H.T. Friederich (whose knowledge of Balinese customs and religion came from palm-leaf manuscripts) – had established Bali as a field of scholarship through a series of studies conducted from the late nineteenth century to the 1920s (e.g. Robinson 1995: 5). The texts of another scholar – V.E. Korn – were particularly influential in the reinforcement of Bali as fragile and unique and a place that needed to be protected from foreign influences and the impact of modernity (Picard 1999: 21). Herman Neubronner Van der Tuuk, whom Adrian Vickers describes as an eccentric intellectual, was also crucially important in this regard. Van der Tuuk was born in Malacca (Malaysia), spent much of his life in the colonies (Vickers 1989), and travelled to Bali in 1870 to study Balinese culture. Van der Tuuk argued fervently against missionary presence in Bali, fearing that conversion to Christianity would slowly erode the unique culture of the island (Vickers 1989: 83). His emphasis on Bali's cultural 'uniqueness' continues to echo in contemporary discourses about Balinese identity by Balinese people and foreigners alike.

During the colonial period, certain Balinese people – former rajas and others who could afford education – obtained access to European education, enabling them to become colonial bureaucrats. European education, which was a requirement for work in the colonial administration, played a profound

role in the formation of an indigenous intelligentsia (Howe 2001; Picard 1999). The intelligentsia became the first to promote the idea of Balinese ethnic cohesion and of Balinese people as an autonomous ethnic group based on the notion of *kebalian* (Balineseness) and the claimed uniqueness of Balinese religion and tradition (*kebalian kita berdasar agama dan adat*) (Picard 1999: 27). According to Michael Picard, the beginnings of debates about *kebalian* can be traced back to colonial Balinese publications initiated by members of the Dutch-educated Balinese elite in North Bali in the 1920s. Through these publications and the debates that surrounded them, Balinese intellectuals developed a concept of Balinese 'culture' (*kebudayaan*). It is important to mention that in its early formulation, the concept of 'culture' was predominantly associated with forms of 'high art', reinforcing class-based assumptions concerning 'civilized' and 'uncivilized' cultural forms seen in Euro-American contexts (Picard 1999: 16). The intelligentsia played a crucial role in the development of Balinese nationalism through the celebration of Balinese cultural distinctiveness and homogeneity. While Dutch colonial rule ended with the Japanese occupation in 1942, memories of the Dutch colonial period and interpretations of the importance of the *puputan* events in Balinese history reverberate through to the postcolonial period, receiving varied interpretations in new contexts that have arisen in the twentieth century (Wiener 1995). Balinese diasporic formations in the Netherlands and the notion of *kebalian* they generate are constituted within a convoluted relationship between the past and the present, making it significantly different from Balinese diasporic formations in other parts of the world.

Kebalian and Foreigners

The notion of *kebalian* has been vigorously discussed in the longstanding entanglements between Balinese people and Euro-American foreigners throughout history, particularly since the 1970s and the development of mass tourism in Bali. The large number of tourists that began flocking to Bali at that time created anxieties about Western influences on Balinese culture, producing discourses in which Westerners were constructed as the 'other'. Processes of globalization were seen as threatening and in need of repudiation (Rubinstein and Connor 1999: 1-15). These concerns led to the development of 'cultural tourism' under the Indonesian New Order government, which aimed to limit the presence of tourists to particular enclaves from which they could pay daily visits to other parts of Bali. Perceiving

Balinese culture in essentialist terms, cultural preservationists aimed to limit the influence that foreign tourists were presumed to exert on Balinese culture in order to protect it.

Debates over foreign influences and cultural tourism in Bali have further strengthened the notion of *kebalian* in relation to Hindu religion (*agama*), custom (*adat*), and culture (*budaya*) (Picard 1996a). In the last several decades, Balinese interaction with foreigners has extended beyond the Balinese tourist industry, as many skilful Balinese workers have found jobs in different Asian cities (Connor and Vickers 2003) or on international cruise ships, using the employment opportunities as a way of travelling and increasing social mobility. Furthermore, through the island's long history of tourism, Balinese people have developed personal relationships with foreign tourists, and some have formed families with foreign visitors. These relations have facilitated Balinese people's temporary or permanent migration to different parts of the world (Dragojlovic 2016).[3] Prior to their migration to the Netherlands, the majority of my interlocutors worked in the Balinese tourist industry as formal or informal cultural brokers and were familiar with Dutch, European, and American representations of Balinese visual and performing arts in the 1920s and 1930s.

The perceived threat of radical Islam which arose after the terrorist attacks in Bali in 2002 and 2005 brought about new debates concerning the foreign presence in Bali and gave rise to a new form of Balinese nationalism referred to as *ajeg* Bali. While *ajeg* literally translates as 'firm and strong', in a broader context it encompasses different aspects of Balinese custom (*adat*), religion (*agama*), and culture (*budaya*) that are taken to represent stability in a contemporary world that has been labelled an 'age of uncertainty' (e.g. Creese 2004; Schulte Nordholt 2007). Thus, the notion of *kebalian* has entered a new phase of public debate in which Balinese identity and its complex relationship with foreigners and foreign influences have once again become a major concern. In 2004, these debates were eagerly taken up by Balinese subaltern citizens and their families, friends, and acquaintances when they found themselves equally threatened by radical Islam after the assassination of Dutch filmmaker Theo van Gogh by a radical Islamist. These sentiments have not faded with time but have rather become an integral part of everyday life in which citizens of Islamic faith are positioned as potentially dangerous others. Thus, the threat of radical Islam has come

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3   Leonard (2006: 160) makes a passing comment about Balinese surfers' migration to Japan and Australia. Connor and Vickers (2003) make tangential comments about Balinese travels overseas.

to stand for the vulnerability of both Bali and the Netherlands, in which the two are situated as ethnically pure and non-Islamic. Such claims serve to establish new conceptualizations of proximity between the two that find numerous articulations in the daily lives of Balinese subaltern citizens. 'Being non-Muslim' allochthonous figures as an important identification marker for Balinese people in everyday encounters, whether in the workforce, neighbourhoods, extended families, or circles of friends.

Balinese Subaltern Citizens: Translocal Belonging

The present population of Balinese people living in the Netherlands consists of approximately 1,000-1,200 families, with numbers progressively increasing each year. It is impossible to estimate the exact number of Balinese people who have moved to live in the Netherlands, since they are classified as Indonesians in official statistics. Unlike migrants of Indies descent who left Indonesia as Dutch subjects immediately after decolonialization in the late 1940s and early 1950s, Balinese migration to the Netherlands began later. Persecuted Balinese leftists found refuge in the Netherlands in the early 1960s, and a much larger number of people moved for the purposes of family reunification following the expansion of mass tourism in Bali in the early 1970s.

When talking about Balinese migration to the Netherlands, it is useful to make a broad distinction between 'forced' and 'voluntary' mobility. Many instances of migration can be put into either of these two categories, and it is important to keep in mind the heterogeneity of both. I use the term 'forced' to highlight the constrained nature of mobility when referring to the experience of Balinese political exiles (*eksils*). These are people who were working or studying overseas when President Sukarno was replaced by President Suharto in 1965-66 in the largest massacre in Indonesian history. Most of those who found themselves overseas at this time were declared communists by the new Indonesian government and were, under mortal threat, disallowed from returning to Indonesia. In the light of this situation, I note that their circumstances do not constitute a forced migration *per se* but rather an inability to migrate *back* to Indonesia – a forced migrant status. 'Voluntary migration', on the other hand, describes the migration practices that began in the mid-1970s with the expansion of Balinese tourism and the formation of families between Balinese people and foreigners. Many of those who went to the Netherlands as exchange students in the 1980s became Dutch citizens either by getting a permanent job there or marrying

a Dutch national. Additionally, several Balinese people were adopted as teenagers by Dutch families who had met them while holidaying in Bali.

The broad distinction between 'forced' and 'voluntary' migratory streams refers also to a migratory timeframe, with forced migration beginning earlier than voluntary migration. By settling in the 1960s, the political *eksil*s paved the way for those who came later, providing a sense of continuity of Balinese presence in Dutch post-coloniality. Within Balinese organizations and networks, elderly members have a place of authority and respect, not only due to their age but also in recognition of the revocation of their Indonesian citizenship, their forced separation from their families in Bali, and their marginalization within Indonesian history.

Balinese people living in the Netherlands today come mainly from the regencies of Karangasem, Buleleng, Badung, Gianyar, Tabanan, and Bangli.[4] Most of them left their homes as young adults to work in the tourist sector, either close to their native villages or in different regencies. The majority of Balinese migrants are *sudra,* the lowest caste, with a minority belonging to the three upper castes – *brahmana, satriya,* and *wesia* – known together as *triwangasa*.[5] Due to the nature of their migratory trajectories – as political refugees or on the basis of family reunification with a Dutch citizen – Balinese people live spread throughout the Netherlands rather than clustered in any one impoverished, socially marginalized, or migrant-dense neighbourhood. Political exiles who found middle-class jobs in the 1970s (mainly because of their higher education) and Balinese migrants who married Dutch citizens live predominantly in middle and upper-middle class neighbourhoods. Many of those who migrated on the basis of family reunification underwent a process of re-education in order to gain jobs as administrators or professionals. Those with only middle school and high school diplomas from Bali predominantly work as labourers, shop assistants, or in the service and care industries. Either way, only a few lack permanent employment. As Indonesia does not allow dual citizenship, most Balinese people living in the Netherlands have Dutch permanent residency, choosing to retain their Indonesian citizenship in order to keep their right to inheritance and their ability to purchase property in Indonesia, the latter being almost impossible for non-Indonesian citizens. The right

4   Bali, one of 30 provinces of the Republic of Indonesia, is divided into eight regencies: Badung, Gianyar, Tabanan, Bangli, Karangasem, Jembrana, Buleleng, and Klungkung.
5   *Triwangsa*: the three upper casts; *Brahmana*: Brahman; *Satria*: member of the second caste; *Wesia*: member of the third caste. According to Howe (2001), 10% of the people in Bali belong to *triwangasa.* It is important to stress that the *wesia* group is presently almost non-existent (Conversation with Henk Schulte Nordholt, 10 June 2014).

to purchase and own property in Indonesia is particularly important for many, as most Balinese-Dutch families have a holiday house, land, or small businesses in Bali, or have plans to obtain such property. Unlike Moroccan and Turkish citizens who tend to have dual nationality and who are continuously portrayed in public discourses as lacking loyalty to the Dutch nation, Balinese permanent residents do not seem to be exposed to such recriminations. Quite on the contrary, as my interlocutors frequently state, 'Being Balinese opens many doors' (*Balinees zijn opent vele deuren*).

I began my fieldwork by recording life histories and conducting semi-structured interviews as a way of introducing my research project and getting to know a large number of people. This generated material on 56 families, providing me with a broader picture about Balinese subaltern citizens in the Netherlands. This book is an ethnography that stays close to the narratives and everyday worlds of my interlocutors, and while my analysis is based on many open-ended interviews with various people, it is through ongoing participation in the networks of my two main interlocutors, Ibu Mariani and Pak Nyoman, that I have obtained the most insightful ethnographic knowledge. Both Ibu Mariani and Pak Nyoman migrated to the Netherlands on the basis of family reunification in the early 1990s and over time became informal leaders in their respective networks as well as the main organizers of social and cultural activities that incorporate Balinese men and women and their Balinese-Dutch families. Many Balinese people are adherents of the large network *Banjar Suka Duka* that convenes twice a year to celebrate *Galungan-Kuningan,* an important Balinese-Hindu festival that occurs once every 210 days according to the Balinese *uku* calendar. Additionally, there are many smaller, informal, fluctuating networks based on proximity of residence and/or common interests. The knowledge that I gained and the people with whom I associated during my fieldwork were largely determined by my main interlocutors' circles of friends and acquaintances. My intensive contact with these networks, my attendance at Balinese public performances, and my in-depth interviews with leftist political refugees from the 1960s generated rich and divergent ethnographic material.

Throughout this book, I engage with the most dominant concepts, practices, and concerns of Balinese subaltern citizens in the Netherlands without implying that being Balinese and living Balineseness (*kebalian*) in Dutch post-coloniality are thereby exhausted. This study falls outside of the epistemological scope of quantitative studies of 'well versus poorly integrated' immigrants (Vermeulen and Penninx 2001; Van Amersfoort and Van Niekerk 2006; Mugge 2011), which I see as an approach that *a priori*

perceives migrants in light of criminality and cultural difference or as people who need to be 'fixed' (that is, integrated[6]) and whose culture is a barrier to integration (Bovenkerk 1990). While my methodological approach is firmly based in ethnography that values qualitative methods, it is important to say that in all spheres of public and private life, Balinese people are never associated with criminality – indeed, quite the opposite is the case. Balinese culture is without exception referred to in the celebratory light of exoticism, and Balinese people are perceived as well-meaning, peace-loving, smiling Hindus who were victims of radical Indonesian Islam. During my research, numerous Dutch partners, in-laws, neighbours, and acquaintances repeatedly stressed to me that Balinese people are not migrants (even if this was the case in legal terms). They made this statement in order to make a distinction between Balinese people and migrants associated with criminality and failed cultural integration. Nevertheless, as my detailed ethnographic material demonstrates, being Balinese in Dutch post-coloniality is situated in manifold modalities of pedagogical citizenship and trained intimacy.

As this book closely follows the narratives of my interlocutors, I insist on the importance of understanding interlocutors' articulations of their subjective selves as socially and historically constituted responses to being subaltern citizens and part of multiethnic and multiracial families in Dutch post-coloniality. My usage of the terms 'multiethnic' and 'multiracial' is primarily guided by my ethnographic material, where labels used for self-identification range from 'Balinese' and 'Balinese with Javanese parentage' to Dutch nationals with Danish, Spanish, Italian, Indies, or German backgrounds who identified themselves as Dutch, while most of the children from these unions identified themselves as 'Dutch with a Balinese parent' and occasionally 'Indo'.[7] Thus, the terms 'multiethnicity' and 'multiraciality'[8] provide a space for specificities and yet are broad enough to incorporate divergent self-identifications based on histories of mobility.

Like my interlocutors, I try to think *through* rather than *between* Bali and the Netherlands. Thus, my analysis is translocal,[9] building on anthropologi-

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6   Essed and Trienekens (2008) as well as Essed and Nimako (2006) provide a particularly insightful criticism on policy-driven research that favours quantitative outcomes over qualitative ones and approaches the integration of immigrants in unproblematic terms. See also Rath (2001).

7   Indo is the term most commonly used by descendants of Indies people.

8   For a detailed discussion about multirace, see Haritaworn (2012).

9   Theories of transnationalism arise as important critiques of the concept of 'rootednesses', a term denoting the understanding that there is a firm relationship between identity and territory

cal scholarship that gives attention to the translocal cultural processes and power relations that are often neglected in debates about globalization. This book contributes to a line of anthropological scholarship that takes translocality as an analytical strategy best suited for the ethnographic actualities that scholars discuss (Marion 2005; Peleikis 2003; Boellstorf 2005; Grewal 2005; Argenti and Röschenthaler 2006; Zhan 2009; Gottowik 2010). The concept of translocality offers an important critique of transnationality, which tends to be too focused on nation-states and national boundaries. A translocal perspective captures the varied and contradictory effects of interconnectedness between places and people. Furthermore, focusing on translocality has the potential to overcome a non-Eurocentric understanding of historical interactions and to approach them instead as processes of 'entanglement and interconnectedness' (Freitag and von Oppen 2010: 1). Drawing on this scholarship, my analytical orientation draws on the relations and processes on which claims to post-colonial intimacy and 'shared heritage' are sustained.

Foreigners, Foreignness, and the Post-Colonial State

The early 2000s in the Netherlands was marked by the rise of the populist politician Pim Fortuyn (who was assassinated in 2002), who referred to Islam as a 'backward' religion and to multiculturalism as a 'Trojan horse' the Dutch had invited into their own society. In the midst of Fortuyn's campaign, Balinese dancer Ni Wayan Sukerti was frequently photographed at Fortuyn's public appearances as an example of a foreigner who was not seen as threatening to Dutch society.[10] As this book demonstrates, we do not *need* to see a Balinese dancer at the centre of right-wing political campaigns to understand how Balinese subaltern citizens see themselves and are perceived by others – as foreigners far removed from public discourses of

(e.g. Gupta and Ferguson 1992; Malkki 1992). These theorizations are primarily concerned with processes of de-territorialization and emerged as a critique of ideas of spatially bound communities (Appadurai 2003; Hannerz 1996). However, more recent studies have drawn scholarly attention to the re-emergence of ethno-nationalist movements and claims to territorialized belonging (Geschiere 2009), urging us to think in translocal terms.

10   Balinese dancer Ni Wayan Sukerti was born and raised in the colonial Dutch East Indies and is supported by and often featured with Pans Schomper. A prolific writer of colonial memories and a participant in the Indo-Dutch cultural landscape, she was featured with Schomper at the *Pasar Malam* in 2004 next to the enlarged picture of the two of them with Pim Fortuyn. See http://home.kpn.nl/niwayansukerti20/prive12groot.htm

problematic migrants. Careful attention to how Balinese people navigate their personal and collective notions of *kebalian* provides important insights into how notions of historical and contemporary (dis)continuities are generated.

Corrective Citizenship: Foreigners and Technologies of Cultural Integration

The Netherlands has long been viewed as a country of tolerance, and for many years it cultivated a strong multicultural orientation. This began to change with the rapid weakening of the welfare state towards the end of the twentieth century, which shifted the multiculturalist tendency to relegate ethnic minorities to separate 'ethnic worlds' towards the ideal of civic integration and migrants' active participation in civic institutions (Joppke 2007: 249). The move towards cultural integration began in the late 1980s when transnational families of mainly Turkish and Moroccan descent began to be characterized as 'on the verge of social disintegration' and were perceived to pose a major threat to the already weakened Dutch welfare state. These concerns subsequently led to the establishment of a novel categorization for non-ethnically Dutch citizens.

The category of *allochtoon* (plural: *allochtonen*) was introduced in 1989 as part of the Minorities Policy and was adopted as a common term to identify 'those who are not originally from here', in contrast to 'autochthonous' people (*autochtoon*), meaning indigenous, native, or authentic. *Allochtoon* is, however, distinguished from *vreemdeling* (alien), which is used to denote those who do not have Dutch citizenship. *Allochtonen* have Dutch citizenship, but they and their children remain *allochtonen*. A citizen is considered *allochtoon* as long as one of his or her parents is foreign born. Note, however, that the offspring of an ethnic white Dutch diplomat or expatriate born and partly raised overseas are not considered *allochtonen* (Essed and Trienekens 2008). The categorization *allochtoon* thus reproduces cultural hierarchies and racial thinking. This regulation of ethnic minorities, driven by the presumed probability of immigrants' dependency on the welfare system, makes a further distinction, namely between rich and poor *allochtonen*. The category *overig arm* (remaining poor) consists of first- and second-generation migrants from Turkey, Morocco, Eastern and Southern Europe, Asia, and Africa, as well as Central and South America. O*verig rijk* (remaining rich) includes those from North and Western Europe, North America, Australia, New Zealand, Japan, and the former Dutch East Indies (Denktas 2001: 4).

In 1998, the Dutch government introduced a new set of policies known as integration programmes (*inburgeringsprogrammas*) implemented through civic integration courses (*inburgeringscursussen*) which are still in operation today. The word *inburgering* contains the word *burger* (meaning 'citizen'), but note that this does not refer to the legal status of being a citizen but rather to a set of values, norms, and skills that must be adopted by those seeking to become Dutch citizens. These programmes are fully subsidized by the state, and newcomers can be required to sign a contract with the Dutch government that obliges them to attend a course that takes up a total of 600 hours (Vermeulen and Penninx 2001: 22). Besides information on the Netherlands' demographics, national history, constitution, and political parties, particular attention is paid to the importance of learning the Dutch language; understanding Dutch values ascribed to everyday sociality; and adopting family norms, gender relations, and appropriate pedagogical methods to be applied in childrearing, employment, and work ethics. This is done through the visual representation of an immigrant who is completely oblivious to Dutch and Western values, thus positioning a non-Western immigrant in opposition to modern Western subjects.

Since the late 1990s, the discourse surrounding these 'common norms and values' as measures towards which non-Western *allochtonen* need to progress has entered the sphere of everyday life. The fact that Western *allochtonen* are not required to take integration courses upon moving to the Netherlands reflects the understanding that citizens of those nations are not only well off but also possess adequate cultural and social competency to allow them to avoid being categorized as problematic foreigners. These changes have raised concerns that Dutch national self-representations are becoming predominantly homogenous and monocultural (Duyvendak 2004; Duyvendak et al. 2009). Furthermore, the 2005 *Law on Integration from Abroad* made the granting of a provisional residence permit (*machtiging tot voorlopig verblijf* – MVV) to family migrants conditional upon their demonstration of a sufficient level of knowledge of Dutch language and society. The Netherlands was the first country in the world to introduce such integration requirements for foreign family members and thus became the country with the most restrictive family migration policies in the European Union. The tests are conducted through an oral exam at a Dutch Consulate which does not provide courses itself but offers practice packs for purchase (Groenendijk 2005; Groenendijk et al. 2007).

The perceived need to protect the integrity of the Dutch ethnic identity has resulted in the regulation of family reunification in the case of non-Western migrants, leading to the inclusion of those foreign family members

who are viewed as ethnically similar to the autochthonous Dutch and the segregation of those who are not. Furthermore, the *Civic Integration Act,* introduced in 2007, requires not only new migrants (*nieuwkomers*) but also permanent residents who are non-Western *allochtonen* (*oudkomers*) to successfully pass the latest civic integration course, allowing state institutions to identify, mobilize, and police the country's entire permanent resident population in order to determine who needs to undergo the integration exam regardless of the number of years they have lived in the Netherlands as permanent residents. Balinese people who as *oudkomers* have had to take the course and the integration exam rarely speak about it, but when they do they use language that expresses disappointment, frustration, and a sense of shame at having been singled out. This is also seen as a failure on the part of the ethnic Dutch spouse and extended Dutch family to facilitate their non-ethnically Dutch family member integration into Dutch society. These uncommon but highly shameful events are examples *par excellence* of situations in which Balinese claims to the status of 'best-of-all-the-rest' within the matrix of foreignness in the Netherlands fail. The possibility of such a failure is a source of collective anxiety and a main motivating force for the perceived need to continuously authenticate oneself as being Balinese – that is, an active long-distance cultural specialist of Balinese culture who is agreeable, peace-loving, anti-Islamic, and fluent in Dutch.

Lauren Berlant has pointed out that citizenship is a relationship among strangers who, through training in politicized intimacy, learn how to claim a common identity based on shared legal, historical, and familial geopolitics (2007: 37). While the aspects of trained intimacy are central for both autochthonous and allochthonous subjects, in the Dutch context it has particular significance for the latter, as they are obliged to undergo normative pedagogies of citizenship through civic integration courses which train new migrants and re-train old migrants and permanent residents away from what is perceived as 'backward' and 'ignorant' outsiders towards the goal of becoming acculturated 'insiders'. Scholars (e.g. Seidman et al. 1999) have convincingly argued that the liberal conception of good citizenship requires that citizens' autonomy be understood as independence, hard work, commitment to monogamy, family values, economic self-sufficiency, and consumption. In this book, I build on Berlant's notion of citizenship as a trained intimacy not so much to talk about specific state policies that are designed to train and retrain migrants into becoming acceptable subjects but to chart how Balinese subaltern citizens actively employ what I refer to as *post-colonial pedagogies* as an active, didactic process of authentication. This process relies on the understanding of the self as a long-distance

cultural specialist who engages in the production of Balineseness as a specific kind of belonging to the internationally celebrated Balinese culture and, in so doing, positions oneself above migrants who are perceived to be troublemakers. These engagements are simultaneously central to Balinese practices of home-building and of feeling at home in post-colonial Dutch society.

Balinese post-colonial pedagogies are a specific form of knowledge production informed by the biopolitics of otherness (Fassin 2001) but not overtly determined by them. The issues of foreignness and otherness in relation to the migrant population have been on the agenda of scholarly inquiry for some time, particularly in relation to refugees and asylum seekers. Building on the Foucauldian analysis of a suffering body, Didier Fassin coins the term 'biopolitics of otherness' to argue that 'the body has become the site of inscription for the politics of immigration' (2001: 4). The body politics of disadvantaged groups have been discussed in different ways by Arendt (1958), Agamben (1998), and Fassin (2001), but my intention here is not to discuss the suffering body but to examine the complex interplay of processes of inclusion and exclusion through practices of 'othering' – produced through the institutionalized apparatus of the nation-state and the ways in which allochthonous and autochthonous subjects articulate and produce otherness both through conformity and subversion. I am interested in examining how these practices are connected to the textures of everyday experiences and how an examination of the everydayness of allochthony allows us to see processes of otherness as they emerge outside of the extreme circumstances of marginalization experienced by asylum seekers and refugees. Far from being of lesser significance, allochthonous citizens' everyday experiences of otherness provide insights into its pervasiveness. Furthermore, this book scrutinizes how Balinese people create and imagine their own hierarchies of otherness in these processes through interpretations of other cultural aesthetics, religiosity, processes of racialization, and everyday sociality.

Citizens with a Background in the Dutch Former Colonies

Dutch debates about foreigners and the related crises of national identity and multiculturalism are primarily focused on Dutch citizens of Muslim faith (Scheffer 2000a, 2000b, 2007; Buruma 2006; Sniderman and Hagendoorn 2007) rather than on those who came (at various stages) from the former Dutch colonies. Thus, those labelled as most problematic have no historical connections with the former Dutch East Indies (Boehmer and

Gouda 2012: 26; Oostindie 2012: 43).[11] Following the trend in public policy and political and scholarly debates about 'immigrant integration', Hans van Amersfoort and Mies van Niekerk have attempted to determine to what extent a particular colonial history leads to migrants' success – or failure – in integrating (Van Amersfoort and Van Niekerk 2006). While scholarly and popular debates about the crisis of Dutch national identity do not specifically refer to immigrants from the former colonies, this specific social and political climate brought about a 'history turn' in the Netherlands and with it extensive scholarly studies about Dutch colonialism and citizens with backgrounds in the colonial Dutch East Indies. It is important to stress that all of the studies were generously funded by the Dutch state research resources[12] and mainly focused on the former Dutch East Indies, which scholars have argued (Boehmer and Gouda 2012: 26-27) stands as a source of pride in Dutch national memory, being remembered as a model colony.

For a discussion about Balinese subaltern citizens in the Netherlands, it is necessary to introduce into Dutch post-coloniality what I refer to as the Indies cultural landscape. Indies immigrants from the Dutch East Indies who arrived after Indonesia's independence was granted to Indonesia in 1949 have continuously been celebrated as a model minority (Boehmer and Gouda 2012; Pattynama 2000), regardless of the initial discrimination and difficulties in finding employment and in adjusting socially they experienced. Paradoxically, while the history of the colonial Dutch East Indies has never occupied a significant place in the formal history curriculum of the Dutch education system (Pattynama 2000; Gouda 1995), the Dutch media has been saturated with fiction films, TV series, documentaries, and travel and fiction writing about the former colony since the early 1960s (Pattynama 2000, 2012). Similarly, several major and many regional museums have significant collections of art and artefacts from the Dutch East Indies alongside numerous private collections of people who themselves or whose relatives once lived in the Dutch East Indies. In the late 1950s, people of Indies descent started organizing regular *pasar malam* (night market) events across the country, creating a cultural landscape in which the geographical places and cultures of the former colony were far from foreign.

11   Dutch historical surveys about ethnic minorities offer lengthy reviews about migrants from the former colonies (Lucassen and Penninx 1994; Obdeijn and Schrover 2008; Laarman 2013).
12   This discussion is beyond the scope of this book. For more information, refer to Bosma, Raben, and Willems 2006; Bosma 2009; Van Leeuwen 2008; Oostindie 2012; Legêne 2011.

Terms of Discussion: Foreignness and Intimacy in Post-Coloniality

To the best of my knowledge, this book is the first and only extensive discussion about Balinese diasporic formations and the production of *kebalian* overseas.[13] I arrive at the notion of diasporic formations drawing on scholarship that approaches diasporas as sites where 'new geographies of identity' (Lavie and Swedenburg 1996) are negotiated across multiple terrains of belonging, creating what Avtar Brah (1996) calls a 'diaspora space'. Based on detailed ethnographic analysis, this book develops the notion of post-colonial intimacy and offers a new perspective on how 'shared heritage' might be understood as an integral part of Balinese homing practices in Dutch post-coloniality. Before I turn my focus to these post-colonial intimacy and home-building practices, it is important to situate my approach within the broader field of post-colonial debates.

Some scholars have approached the 'colonial and post-colonial world' not as geographical locations but rather as historical epochs (Memmi 1991; Fanon 1963; Bhabha 1994). In my view, seeing post-colonialism in a simplistic, chronological sense is highly problematic, primarily because of its universalizing attempts to grasp a variety of colonial histories as inadequate temporalities and to make colonialism a marker of historical difference (McClintock 1995; Hall 1996a; Ahmed 2000). My approach to post-colonialism owes much to Sara Ahmed's insistence that post-colonialism should be seen as a set of complex and changing relationships between present and historical encounters (2000: 11) – in this case, between Balinese and Dutch people. I look at how these are understood, interpreted, appropriated, and enacted in the practice of everyday life. Balinese subaltern citizens' daily encounters evoke and reopen colonial histories and the unequal power relations within them, continuously producing and subverting imaginations of people and places. These interwoven past-present relationships inform everyday and future claims to intimacy and proximity. In this way, post-colonialism is about the complex relationships between the past and the present, European colonization, and contemporary forms of globalization. As Frankenberg and Mani (1996) have argued, the 'post' in post-colonial does not stand for 'after' but instead 'mark[s] spaces of ongoing contestation enabled by decolonization' (1996: 275). This approach to post-colonialism allows for the analysis of how colonial encounters resonate in the present

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13   Bagus' 1998 MA thesis analyzes 'Balinese-Australian' marriage practices through the lens of acculturation in Bali and multiculturalism in Melbourne, Australia.

but does not overtly determine them.[14] Equally instructive here is Inderpal Grewal's discussion (2005) about 'transnational connectivities', which she develops in order to re-historicize transnationalism. Her specific concern is in emphasizing multiple processes of knowledge production which move through webs of connections 'along historicized trajectories' (2005: 22). This is important, as it avoids the pitfalls of seeing colonialism and post-colonialism through the lens of radical rupture.

In this book, I offer a framework for the conceptualization of post-colonial intimacy. Intimacy is varied and can stand as both associations and familiarity with people, places, and things but it can also be a synonym for sexual relationships. A good example of a study of intimacy chiefly associated with sexual relations in or outside of the conjugal setting (and not problematized any further) is a collection entitled *Intimacies: Love and Sex Across Cultures* (2008) edited by anthropologist William Jankowiak. Another example is British sociologist Anthony Giddens' *The Transformation of Intimacy* (1992), in which he analyzes intimacy between partners as the pinnacle of modernity. As a transformation of 'romantic' to 'confluent' love, Giddens associates intimacy primarily with autonomy and trust between two individuals and completely neglects the possibility that intimacy can be convoluted and tension-ridden. Taking intimacy to the cultural sphere, anthropologist Michael Herzfeld conceptualizes 'cultural intimacy' as a counterpoint to official nationalism. In his seminal work *Cultural Intimacy: Social Poetics in the Nation-State* (2005), Herzfeld stresses the centrality of 'rueful self-recognition' (2005: 6) as much as ambiguities and tensions, within what Benedict Anderson refers to as the 'imagined community' of a nation. Herzfeld defines 'cultural intimacy' as 'the recognition of those aspects of cultural identity that are considered a source of external embarrassment but that nevertheless provide insiders with their assurance of common sociality' (Herzfeld 2005: 3). The crucial point in his conceptualization of intimacy is the presence of an outsider whose opinion is vital in determining the value of the 'common sociality'. Herzfeld focuses his conceptualization of cultural intimacy on the example of the Greek government's attempt to ban the breaking of plates in restaurants frequented by tourists. The argument was that this practice was not only 'not Greek' but also humiliating for some Greeks, who had to accept that Northern European tourists perceived this practice as quintessentially Greek. Thus, Herzfeld argues, breaking plates becomes a

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14   Mercer (1988) refers to diaspora's 'syncretic dynamic' as set in motion by de-colonization and global migration, in the aftermath of post-colonization/de-colonization.

site of cultural intimacy for Greeks in relation to tourist observers, wherein the intimacy that emerges through self-recognition is decidedly Greek (Herzfeld 2005).

In the 2005 revised edition of his book, which was originally published in 1997, Herzfeld broadened the scope of the concept of 'cultural intimacy' to emphasize its dynamic rather than static qualities and to argue for geographical plasticity rather than a strong focus on the nation-state. These revisions are highly relevant to my discussion of Balinese post-colonial intimacy. Rather than being confined to one particular nation-state at one particular time, the post-colonial intimacy discussed in this book is produced across colonial and post-colonial places and temporalities. Following Herzfeld's argument that '[c]ultural intimacy is about alternative discourses – whether at the level of semantics ... or of outward expression' (2005: 54), I explore how claims to intimacy and proximity in the Balinese-Dutch context draw on Balinese understandings of historical agency and the tension-ridden sense of intimacy and proximity to the former colony.

An approach to intimacy that goes beyond a narrow understanding of conjugal relations and intimacy, separated from their tension-ridden aspects, has been advanced by literary and cultural theorist Lauren Berlant (1998). For Berlant, intimacy is not only full of ambiguity but also belongs to the public rather than the private sphere. Intimacy in society, she argues, is 'founded on the migration of intimacy expectations between the public and the domestic' (1998: 284). For Berlant, intimacies create social, national, political, cultural, familial, and sexual spaces that define and constrain what forms of relationships and subjectivities are perceived as legal, viable, and ethical. In line with this, it is important to say that processes of otherness are also processes of intimation, which Svetlana Boym (1998: 499) convincingly argues does not stand in opposition to uprootedness but is rather constituted by it in the diasporic context.

My aim here is not to work towards an analytical definition of intimacy in addition to those outlined above but rather to explore the divergent degrees of distance and proximity to the colonial that Balinese subaltern citizens employ in generating forms of knowledge and familiarity between the self and others in time and place. Through the ethnography of such engagements, I hope to map out the changing notion of *kebalian* and what it means to feel at home as a Balinese person and collectivity in Dutch post-coloniality. Building on the definitions outlined above, my aim is to further develop an understanding of post-colonial intimacy as generated

by subaltern citizens. I recognize post-colonial intimacy as a relationship of proximity and mutuality between Balinese and Dutch people rather than as a relationship which demarcates Balinese people as those with extremely limited power (the colonized/migrants and allochthonous citizens) and Dutch people as those with the ultimate power (the colonizers/autochthonous citizens). If the notion of post-colonial intimacy is a complex reification of claims to proximity and mutuality between the Balinese and the Dutch during colonialism, it is also a reaction to current debates about foreigners and foreign practices perceived as ultimately in disagreement with Dutch cultural values. Thus, post-colonial intimacy here stands in opposition to the imaginary figure of the undesirable migrant of Muslim faith but also to that of the most recent migrants from the Antilles and Afro-Suriname who are similarly designated as problematic (for a discussion of the latter, see Van Amersfoort and Van Niekerk 2006). Balinese claims to intimacy and proximity would not be durable or even possible without an active appreciative engagement by those with whom the intimacy is claimed – the Dutch.

While a discussion about Dutch collective memory of the Dutch East Indies is beyond the scope of my current discussion, it is important to stress again that the Dutch cultural landscape has a long and rich Indies tradition and has produced a sphere in which the geographical places and cultures of the former colony are far from foreign. In order to tackle these questions, it is useful to turn to Alison Landsberg's notion of 'prosthetic memory' (1995). Interested in 'memories of events through which one did not live', Landsberg advances the notion of prosthetic memory wherein mediated memories are crucial in constituting subjectivities in the present. In the Dutch post-colonial context, it is useful to include ongoing public representations of cultures and people from the former colony through festivals and the visual and performing arts. These events – organized mainly by people of Indies and Dutch descent whose ancestors once lived in the Dutch East Indies – are attended by many and serve processes of intimation whereby the cultural landscapes of the former colony and present-day Indonesia are continuously inscribed into the contemporary Dutch cultural landscape. In a broad sense, they serve the process of internalization, and thus normalization, of the wider Indonesian cultural aesthetic. Thus, I argue, in order to understand Balinese subaltern citizens' production of post-colonial intimacy in Dutch post-coloniality, it is not enough to look only at current geopolitics (Jansen 2009) and how migrant populations are both regulated by them and rely on them for self-positioning; we must also pay attention to historically based connectivities.

'Shared' Heritage

The issue of national identity and colonial heritage are deeply contested in the Netherlands and have been on the political and research agenda since the late 1990s.[15] In general, they have been referred to as 'common', 'shared', or 'mutual' heritage, and 'heritage overseas' (Fienieg at el. 2009: 26). In the mid-1990s, the Dutch government began to create a political infrastructure to ensure the funding of projects that would help the preservation of Dutch colonial heritage. The term 'common' was adopted to describe policies that encompassed joint conservation by the Dutch state and other nation-states in which such heritage was located (ibid.: 24). Starting from the presumption that cultural heritage from the Dutch colonial period was formed under reciprocal cultural influence, it was assumed that the nation-states listed as priorities in the project by the Dutch (such as Indonesia, Sri Lanka, Suriname, Brazil, and Ghana) would have similar attitudes and interests (ibid.: Oostindie 2009).

'Shared heritage' as discussed in this book is not related to the Dutch Common Cultural Heritage Policy (DCCH), although that policy is discussed in chapter three of this book. Chapter three examines the DCCH-funded exhibition entitled *Indonesia: The Discovery of the Past,* with a focus on how it was received by Balinese subaltern citizens and how it played an important role in the configuration of *kebalian.* Not being familiar with the DCCH or its policy objectives, my interlocutors made their own claims to shared heritage that were not intended or even envisaged by policymakers. As will be discussed in chapter three, a close reading of the Balinese reception of this exhibition is important, as it urges us not only to approach cultural heritage as a dynamic process but also to appreciate subaltern citizens' claims to shared history and ensuing post-colonial intimacy.

In this book, I take particular Balinese interpretations of the shared past to show how specific understandings of colonial materialities serve to authenticate post-colonial intimacy. This ethnography is firmly based on an analytical orientation towards relations and processes in which knowledge is produced through anticipated connectivities but also through disjunctures and the surprising linkages and associations people make between the past and the present. While Balinese cultural narratives are couched in the language of proximity to the Dutch and saturated with

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15   Funded by the Ministry of Education, Culture and Science, the KITLV (*Koninklijk Instituut voor Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde*) ran a research programme entitled 'Migration and culture in the Dutch colonial world' (see Oostindie 2009).

a sense of pride and superiority over other foreigners, this is not to say that Balinese people are not aware of the various forms of inequalities, marginalization, and everyday forms of racism which surround and affect them. In order to better understand Balinese interpretative understandings of a shared colonial heritage in which they do not position themselves as colonized people with no or very limited agency, we also need to attend to the production of knowledge, realities, and fields of power that have been marginalized, discarded, or, in Foucault's words, 'disqualified' (2003).

Home and 'Homing'

In addition to extending the notion of cultural intimacy, a key theoretical innovation in this book is thinking about the processes through which migration and life in multiethnic, multiracial families are experienced in relation to home, and how senses of home and belonging are made, reimagined, and sustained over a period of time in relation to both the individual and the collective. I build on scholarship concerned with 'home-building' for migrants of common ethnic backgrounds (Hage 1997, 2010; Olwig 2007; Korac 2009) but challenge the assumption that mobility as 'detachment' stands for 'liquidity' (Bauman 2000; Urry 2000), 'nomadic' identities (Braidotti 1994), or the 'creolization' of global culture (Hannerz 1996; Featherstone 1995). Rather, I explore how 'roots' and mobility do not stand in opposition to each other but are instead mutually constitutive, ongoing processes (Hall 1990, 1991; Clifford 1997; Fortier 2000; Ahmed et al. 2003; Korac 2009).

Beyond Bali explores the ways in which people move in and inhabit the world as situated in historical contingencies. It also looks at the circulation of materiality through diverse social worlds and processes of moving and inhabiting the world in which national histories, objects, and the visual and performing arts are employed in processes of 'homing'. As scholars of critical studies of diaspora and migration have shown (Clifford 1994; Brah 1996), 'home' in migration is not something that is left behind nor even necessarily something with which migrants can or wish to maintain an active relationship. Avtar Brah (1996: 180) refers to the 'homing' desire as 'a desire to feel at home in migration', while Ann-Marie Fortier (2003) stresses that 'homing' is also a longing to belong. Scholars of queer migration have importantly stressed that home in migration can be a destination rather than an origin (Fortier 2001, 2003). Seeing the notion of home and of 'homing' as processual allows us to explore the intricate relationships between

senses of self, place, and belonging as imagined, shaped, and contested in different spheres of life.

'Homing' contains notions of working out, thinking, articulating, arranging, and dealing with divergent modalities of being and feeling at home in migration. If we think of my Balinese interlocutors as actively navigating their way through the major social transformations of post-colonial Dutch society by creatively dealing with the demands put forward by state policies that regulate integration, we arrive at a dynamic understanding of the post-colonial one that is not commonly found in analyses of public discourses about immigrants or integration policies. Importantly, the concept of 'homing' having processual qualities, therefore emphasizes Balinese interlocutors' active, creative, and ongoing engagements with the many different values, imaginaries, and histories associated with Bali, Indonesia, and Balinese visual and performing arts. In a broad sense, colonial histories are actively appropriated to serve processes of 'homing' in the present. The concept of 'homing' thus enables us to recognize agency without uncritically adopting a notion either of individual or cultural autonomy, or of complete freedom, or indeed of the fixed constraints posed by the structures of power within which people live.

'Menjajah kota den Haag' – Colonizing the City of The Hague

Geographically situated in the centre of the Randstad (a conurbation consisting of the four largest cities in the Netherlands: Amsterdam, Rotterdam, The Hague, and Utrecht), the Dutch city of The Hague has the highest number of Balinese people in all of the Netherlands. Since 2010, when a group of Balinese people formed a gamelan orchestra and began rehearsing regularly in the Indonesian Embassy in The Hague, the city has become a regular site of sociality for Balinese people living all over the country.[16] The social gatherings that take place around the city are often captured in photographs and distributed via social media, thus providing insights into Balinese social gatherings in the Netherlands for friends and

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16   Since the nineteenth century, high-level civil servants from the Dutch East Indies used to spend their leave and holidays in The Hague. Following the decolonization of the Dutch East Indies, a sizable Indies population settled in The Hague, and many streets in the city were named after places in the Dutch East Indies. In Indies popular culture, the city is often referred as 'the widow of the Indies' (*den haag weduwe van indie*), and a well-known Indies singer and performer Wieteke van Dort has a song with the same title. See https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RfbTNVrMlfw

family members living in Bali and across other Balinese diasporic spaces. These images are often accompanied with the caption, 'colonizing the city of The Hague' (*Menjajah kota den Haag*) and followed by a long thread of similar comments. This very specific reference to the colonial history stresses the physical presence of Balinese people in the Netherlands and shows an intention to actively invest in shaping Dutch post-coloniality. The phrase 'colonizing the city of The Hague' captures Balinese people's understanding of themselves as subaltern citizens with historical agency but also highlights their limitations in the present.

My ethnographic material leads me to engage with historically situated subjective interpretations of the self and ways of being in the world. Drawing on Foucauldian frameworks of subjectification (2000), my interest is in how subject positions and subjectivities, as lived experiences that are culturally and historically specific,[17] are embraced and lived in relation to the experience of life in migration as well as to the production of Balinese cultural aesthetics and engagement in the commemoration of colonial atrocities in Dutch post-coloniality. Of further importance for my analysis is Stuart Hall's classical approach to identities as constantly produced and reproduced through transformation and differentiation (see Hall 1990, 1991; Hall and Du Gay 1996). Thus, identities and selfhood are relational and emerge through contested and fluid processes:

> Cultural identities come from somewhere, have histories. But like everything which is historical, they undergo constant transformations. Far from being externally fixed in some essentialist past, they are subject to the continuous 'play' of history, culture and power. (Hall 1990: 225)

Beyond Bali is a case study on how subjectivities come to be through complex processes of 'articulation'. My approach to articulation follows Hall (1985), who defines 'articulation' as:

> [...] a connection or link which is not necessarily given in all cases, as a law or a fact of life, but which requires particular conditions of existence to appear at all, which has to be positively sustained by specific processes, which is not 'eternal' but has constantly to be renewed, which can under some circumstances disappear or be overthrown, leading to the old linkages being dissolved and new connections – re-articulated – being forged. It is also important that an articulation between different practices does

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17   See also Boellstorff 2005.

not mean that they become identical or that the one is dissolved into the other. Each retains its distinct determinations and conditions of existence. However, once an articulation is made, the two practices can function together, not as an 'immediate identity' … but as 'distinctions within a unity'. (1985: 113-114)

In a similar vein, Diane M. Nelson (1999), inspired by Hall, employs the notion of articulation in order to discuss relations that create new identifications and social connections. Building on this scholarship, my analysis approaches the process of articulation as a pursuit of meaningful subject positions; as ways of making sense, of making one's home, and of feeling at home. In this way, processes of articulation foreground both the struggles and the pleasures involved in home-making processes in Dutch post-coloniality.

My ethnographic material also urges me to incorporate into my analysis 'person-object' relationships which, as scholars have shown, have been crucial for migrant populations throughout history (Parkin 1999). In his critique of Foucault's humanist philosophy, Bruno Latour (1993) proposes an approach that focuses on 'non-human actors', wherein tangible objects of different kinds are considered to have agency and can act in their own right, beyond what human beings might project onto them. Giving primacy to the objects in their critique of social constructivism, the actor network theory tends to completely devalue the usage of language, interpretation, and the subjective (see also Navaro-Yashin 2009, 2012). My employment of Foucault's philosophy, which centres on subjects and subjectivities, and Latour's and the actor network theory's 'object-centred' philosophy might seem in op-position to each other. However, the analysis of my ethnographic material makes sense only if we adopt Navaro-Yashin's position that '[o]bjects are … qualified through language. They could be neither pre- nor post-linguistic. Nor could they be non-symbolic.' (2009: 9). Similar to Navaro-Yashin's ethnography of Northern Cyprus (2012), my ethnographic data urges me not to make a sharp distinction between subject and subjectivities on the one hand and objects on the other but to use both approaches together in the service of a productive analysis of the ethnographic material at hand.